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Legal Computation of Periods of

Time in Pennsylvania
Situations constantly arise in the practice of all lawyers
which necessitate the computation of periods of time. Examples are the fifteen-day period granted defendants to
file affidavits of defense; the calculation of proper dates
for the return of summons; and limits set by election laws
for the filing of nomination papers and the withdrawal of
candidates.
Despite the many decisions which have set forth the
proper method of calculating periods of time under various
statutes and in various situations, the question is by no
means a settled one. This is due to the fact that the same
rule is not applied to the computation of time under all
circumstances, and also because the courts, even under the
same circumstances, seem unable, sometimes, to agree upon
a uniform method of calculation.
There are several distinct types of situations in which
the calculation of time is frequently necessary. These are:
1. Situations where a property interest passes
(such as arises when a lease is executed);
2. Problems which arise with regard to elections
and which must be solved by reference to the blection
laws;
3. Situations where a party is entitled to a certain
number of days' notice before an act may be performed
by the one giving the notice;
4. Situations where a party is given a certain time
to do an act; and
5. Situations involving return days, etc., in which
the question is as to the legality of some action taken
by a magistrate, court, or officer thereof.
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If these various types of situations are distinguished,
the problem of correctly computing time is considerably
simplified, and most, although not all, of the apparently
conflicting decisions in the field may be reconciled.
Type I-Where a Property Interest Passes
The law is plain as regards the first type of situation.
If a lease is executed on June 1 for a period of one year,
the count starts on June 1 and the year expires May 31.1
And the count starts with the day of execution, even
though, as in the above case, the words were: "to continue
during and until the full term of 21 years next ensuing the
day and year above written".
And where a bond is dated July 22, and made payable
in five years "from date", it is payable on July 21. The
count starts on the day of execution. 2
However, there may be, in connection with the sale of
a bond or other property, an agreement which is not governed by the above method of counting time. Where bonds
were sold April 21, and the buyer agreed to hold them for
one year, it was held that the count began with April 22,
in obedience to the so-called "general rule", discussed be3
low, under the fourth type of situation.
Type ll-Where Periods of Time are Connected with
Elections
Taking up the second type of situations, that is, those
connected with elections, the law is clear that periods of
time ante-dating the election are computed under the Act
of July 9, 1919, P. L. 832, amending the Act of June 10,
1893, P. L. 419 and the Act of July 9, 1897, P. L. 223, whose
provision as to the calculation of time "is part of the general election system of the Commonwealth"* and reads:
-Nesbit v. Godfrey, 155 Pa. 251 (1893).
2Lysle

v. Williams, 15 S. & R. 135 (1827).
sWeed v. Barker, 153 Pa. 465 (1893).
4EIlwood City Borough's Contested Election, 286 Pa. 257, on
page 263 (1926). Note that the Act of July 9, 1919, P. 1,. 832, is

erroneously referred to as P. L. 382.
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"In determining or reckoning any period of time
mentioned in this act, the day upon which the act is
done, paper filed, or notice given, shall be excluded
from, and the date of the election shall be included in,
the calculation or reckoning".
So that where a (substitute) nomination for burgess
was filed October 14, and the election was November 3, the
filing was held to be within the twenty days provided for
by the Act of July 9, 1919, P. L. 832.1
Type Ill-Where a Party Is Entitled to a Certain Notice
Before an Act May Be Performed by the One Who
Gives the Notice
We must now consider the third type of situation,
where the one receiving the notice is entitled to a certain
number of days' notice before an act may be performed by
the one giving the notice.
There are two possible sub-classifications under this
third type of situation. First, we have a set of circumstances under which the purpose of the notice is to give
the party notified a certain number of days to take some
action, in the absence of which the notifying party may
then proceed. Secondly, we have a set of circumstances
under which there is no action which the party notified can
take, and the notice is given merely to enable the notified
party to prepare himself for the action which the notifying
party proposes to take. The following situations are illustrative:
First sub-classification: Where a superintendent of
schools on July 6 notified a teacher that he proposed to
annul the teacher's certificate on July 16, under a statute
giving the superintendent this power and requiring the
superintendent to give "at least 10 days' previous notice
to the teacher", it was held that the notice was insufficient,
because the purpose of the notice was to enable the teacher
to present any defense which he might have, that the
teacher was entitled to 10 full days in which to present this
5Ellwood City Borough's Contested Election, supra,
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defense, and the count should start on July 7. The teacher
would therefore be entitled to the 10 days from July 7
to July 16, inclusive, and any action by the superintendent
prior to July 17 would be premature.6
Where a distress for rent was levied upon a tenant's
goods on February 1, and a statute provided that the tenant
was entitled to five days therefrom in which to replevy the
goods, if he so desired, after which the landlord might proceed to appraise and sell the goods, it was held that the
count of the five days started with February 2, and the
tenant was entitled to the five days from February 2 to
February 6 inclusive, and that any appraisement by the
landlord prior to February 7 would be premature. 7
Under the first sub-class of the third type appear, also,
the situations where a rule is taken by a plaintiff to do
some act, such as to file an affidavit of defense "within 15
days from the service" of the statement of claim upon him.
The count in such case starts on the day following the
service, and the defendant has 15 full days to file his affidavit of defense. If this is not done, plaintiff may take
judgment by default, on the day after the expiration of
the period. So that where a writ and statement were
served on February 18, plaintiff would have been entitled
to judgment in default of an affidavit of defense on March
6.8
It will be observed that the rule in this first sub-classification of the third type is the same as the rule under the
fourth type of situation, to be discussed post.
Second sub-classification: Where a lease was made on
March 25 for a year (and would consequently expire at the
end of March 24 next), and the tenant was entitled to three
months' notice to quit, it was held that notice on December
25 was sufficient. There was no action which the tenant
could take during the period of notice. The notice was
given him merely to enable him to prepare for the action
(re-entry) to be taken by the landlord at the end of the
sScheibner v. Baer, 174 Pa. 482 (1896).
?Whitton v. Milligan, 153 Pa. 376 (1893).
sMuir v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 338 (1902).
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period of notice. Therefore the count would start with
December 25, the date of the notice, the three-months'
period would cover the dates December 25 to March 24
inclusive, and the landlord would be entitled to re-enter on
March 25.9
Similarly, where, after appraisement of a tenant's
goods, public sale thereof could take place by the landlord
only "after six days' public notice", but the tenant had no
power to take any action during the notice period, it was
held that notice on February 7 would support a sale on
February 13.10 It should be observed, however, that the
Court in this case did not start the count on the day of
the notice, but on the next day, February 8, and counted
the sale day to make up a total of six days' notice. It
would appear much more logical to start the count on the
day of notice and not to count the sale day.
So, also, in Rich v. Boguszinsky," where a statute 2 required a sub-contractor intending to file a mechanics' lien
to serve notice on the owner "at least one month before the
claim is filed," and notice was given October 19, and a
claim was filed November 19, it was held that the notice.
was sufficient. Instead of starting the count on the day
of notice, however, the Superior Court invoked the Act
of June 20, 1883, P. L. 136, began the count on October
20 and included November 19 as the last day of the month
of notice, even though the claim was made on that day. The
Court apparently misconstrued the act of 1883. This act applies only to the computation of a period succeeding some
certain date, during which period a party may perform an
act, if he wishes. The act does not apply to notice periods
antedating an act, during which period the one notified
can do nothing but wait.
The error of the Superior Court is indicated by its
reliance, in Rich v. Boguszinsky, supra, upon Herr v. Moss
ODuffy v. Ogden, 64 Pa. 240 (1870).
'OWhitton v. Milligan, supra.
2188 Pa. Super. Ct. 586 (1926).
"2Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 431 amended by the Act of March
24, 1909, P. L. 65.
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Cigar Co., 237 Pa. 232, (1912), where it was held logically
that the act of 1883 did protect an owner against mechanics' liens where a copy of the contract was filed by
the cautious owner with the prothonotary "within 10 days
after its execution," with the execution on May 23 and
the filing on June 3 (June 2 being a Sunday and so omitted from the count). In other words, this period of time
succeeded the date of execution of the contract.
The result, however, is the same in cases falling under
this second sub-class, whether the count starts with the day
of notice and continues until, but not including the day of
the act, or whether the day of the notice is omitted, the
count starting with the next day, and continuing to, and
including, the day of the act.
Type IV-Where a Party is Given a Certain Time to Act
The fourth type of situation involves the computation
of the period of time given, by some law or rule of court,
to some party for the performance of an act.
The leading case on this subject is Cromelien v. Brink,
"29 Pa. 522 (1858), where land was sold for taxes on June
10, 1850, and redeemed on June 10, 1852. Two years were
given for redemption. The Court decided that the redemption was in time, because the count of the period allowed
for the performance of the act started on June 11, 1850,
the day after the so-called terminus a quo.
The statute of June 20, 1883, P. L. 136, sec. 1, is declaratory of the prior common law covering this situation.'3
The cases of Hampton v. Erenzeller, 2 Browne 18 (1811);
Thomas v. Afflick, 16 Pa. 14 (1851), and Agnew v. Philadelphia, 2 Phila. 370 (1857), are no longer law, having been
overruled by Cromelien v. Brink, supra.
Type V-Where the Legality of the Issuance or Service of
Writs, Summons, and Other Like Papers Is Involved
We now take up the computation of time where the
circumstances of the case fit the fifth type of situation. In
"'Lutz's Appeal, 124 Pa. 280 (1889),
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cases involving the computation of time connected With the
issuance or service of writs, summons, and other like
papers, where the words in the controlling statute are "at
least (so many days) before" or "returnable not less than
(so many days) nor more than (so many days) after issuance (or service)," the day a quo (that is, the day on
which the originating act is performed) should be omitted
from the count, the count should start with the day following the issuance or service, and the final or return day
should be omitted.
So where a summons is returnable not less than five
days after its issuance, and issuance is on the tenth of the
month, the count starts on the eleventh, and the fifth day
will be the fifteenth. The earliest return day will be the
sixteenth.
And, correspondingly, where a summons is returnable
''not more than eight days after issuance", and issuance
is on the first of the month, the last possible return day
is the ninth. If the tenth inst. is made the return day,
14
it is too late.
Contrary to the above decisions is the much-cited case
of Justice v. Meeker, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 207 (1906). In this
case the Superior Court overruled a long line of cases
holding similarly to the citations in the preceding paragraph, and held that the count should start on the day
following the issuance of the summons, and include the
return day.
So where a summons issued on May 17, and the statute
required appearance to be "not more than eight nor less
than five days after the date of the summons," and the
summons was made returnable May 22, it was held to be
valid. The count started May 18, May 22 was day number
five, and May 22 was one of the "five" days, although it
was also the return day. However, this decision stands
14See the leading case of Gregg's Estate, 213 Pa. 260 (1906); followed in Guyer v. Bender, 4 D. & C. 466 (1923); Conoway v. Smith,
16 Dist. R. 501 (1907); Biever v. Troiano, 2 D. & C. 487 (1923) and
Wilver v. Keim, 8 D. & C. ,56 (1926),
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unsupported, except for one case, Hughes v. Swartz, 30 Dist.
R. 715 (1921).
Miscellaneous Elements
It will be worth while to take up now several miscellaneous elements entering into the legal computation of
time.
Sundays.-Sundays are always counted except in two
situations. Sunday is not counted when it is the last day of
a period coming either under the first sub-classification of
the third type of situation or under the fourth type. So
where a decree was handed down on April 12 and 20 days
were allowed for an appeal, the last day of the period falling on May 2, which was a Sunday, an appeal was allowed
on May 3.15
The other situation in which Sunday is omitted from
the count arises when, after verdict, a motion is made
for a new trial or in arrest of judgment. Four days are
allowed, and the count starts the day after the verdict is
rendered, and Sunday is omitted in the count. 16 Quaere
as to whether, since the Statute of 1883, supra, Sunday
would be omitted if it fell on other than the fourth day.
Logically, it should not be omitted. The cited cases are
older than the statute, and the question has not arisen for
judicial decision since the passage of the statute.
In connection with negotiable instruments, the final
Sunday is omitted. So that where a 15-day note is executed on the first inst., and the 15th inst. is Sunday, that
Sunday is omitted, and the note matures on the 16th inst.
Legal Holidays.-With regard to legal holidays, by the
Act of June 23, 1897, P. L. 188, section 5, re-enacting prior
law, legal processes on these days are valid. So writs and
summons may be issued, served and entered. And it was
15Gosweiler's

Estate, 3 P. & W. 200 (1831); Herr v. Moss, 237

Pa. 232 (1912).
16
Parkinson v. Snyder, 2 W. N. C. 428 (1876); Golder v. Blackstone, 1 T. & H. Practice, section 415 (1820); Sims v. Hampton, 1

S. & R. 411 (1815).
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held that where the last day for taking an appeal was Labor
Day, an appeal the next day was too late."7 However, by
these cases, it seems that if the offices of courts and prothonotaries are closed on legal holidays, that later action
may be allowed nunc pro tunc.
Month.-A month is a calendar month, unless other8
wise expressed, in contracts and civil proceedings.' Where
prison sentences are concerned, however, quaere. There are
two cases, Comm. v. Martin, 2 D. R. 330 (1893), holding
that a month means a lunar month (of 28 days), in obedience to the old English common law, and Comm. v. Lewis,
19 D. R. 770 (1910), which holds that "at this day, the word
month ought to be deemed to be a calendar month." In
practice, Comm. v..Lewis is followed.
Fractions of Days.-Fractions of days, do not count in
computing legal periods of time. A day is an indivisible
point of time. It has neither length nor breadth, but simply
position without magnitude. 9
And there is no longer any legal difference in the
phrases: "From an act done," "from the day of the date,"
"From a day" and "from a date."
17Patterson v. Gallitzin B. & L. Assn., 23 Pa. Super Ct. 54 (1903),
overruling prior cases. Cited favorably in Ambrose v. Laughlin, 81
Pa. Super. Ct. 437 (1923).
laShapley v. Garey, 6 S. & R. 539 (1821).
'9 Justice v. Meeker, supra and Cromelien v. Brink, supra.
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